



Director of
Central Intelligence

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YUGOSLAVIA: Threatened Oil Shortage

Yugoslav economic growth this year is likely to slow if oil shortages and balance-of-payments constraints persist. A shortfall in planned oil imports of 40,000 barrels per day--equivalent to the expected growth in energy consumption this year--is the result of a leveling off of crude oil deliveries from the USSR and Iraq, which provide almost 90 percent of Yugoslav oil imports.

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

UGANDA: Prospects for a New Government

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Now that the invading Tanzanian and Ugandan exile forces have established control in Kampala, installing and gaining recognition of a new Ugandan government will be their next tasks. The new government will be hampered by the country's deep-seated ethnic, religious, and political divisions. As for Tanzania, it will face some hard decisions about its future role in Uganda--and the heavy costs that could be involved. Neighboring Kenya, which controls Uganda's access to the sea, will also play a crucial part in determining the new government's viability.

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The Ugandan National Liberation Front, a coalition of exiles hastily put together late last month under Tanzanian auspices, has already begun transforming itself into a government. The Front is a coalition of long-time rivals that appears to stress tribal balance more than political consistency. It is headed by the 67-year-old Yusufu Lule--a widely respected former educator--and a 10-member executive council.

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Yesterday, Lule--speaking from Dar es Salaam in a broadcast carried by Kampala radio--announced that he is Uganda's new president, defense minister, and commander in chief of the armed forces. Other key appointments, notably the ministers of interior and foreign affairs, went to supporters of Lule's main rival, former President Obote. Lule's initial appointments suggest that he may be trying to deflect a power struggle within the new regime while compromising enough to assure continued Tanzanian backing. According to an earlier report, Lule's government was prepared to fly into Kampala later this week.

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//Obote, a resident of Tanzania since Idi Amin overthrew his government in 1971, had long been considered Tanzania's choice to head a post-Amin government. Obote is unpopular in Uganda, however, and Tanzanian President Nyerere appears finally to have decided that he is a liability. Obote probably believes he has a stronger network of supporters than any other contender and that there will be further political sparring before the succession is finally established. He may expect Nyerere eventually to turn to him again, especially if Lule's government fails.// [REDACTED]

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The Tanzanian Army still controls, arms, and supplies the Front's armed forces and will be encouraged to stay long enough to damp down Ugandan political rivalries. Although the exiles' military force did not give a very impressive account of itself in the war against Amin, it is a relatively coherent group that may yet become an arbiter of power. [REDACTED]

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//About half of the 2,000-man exile army is probably composed of Obote supporters, and the deputy commander of this army and the chairman of the Front's military committee are both close to Obote. Working with these assets, Obote may believe he can use the exile military force to intimidate the Front's civilian leadership. Ambitious commanders, however, might just as well use the troops to wrest control for themselves.// [REDACTED]

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The passivity of the Ugandan population throughout the war may give the returnees and their Tanzanian backers a misleading impression that it will not be hard to establish a workable government. In addition to those who bear long-standing ethnic, religious, or political grudges against Uganda's new rulers, those who endured the Amin years in Uganda are unlikely to welcome authority exercised by those who did not. This kind of jealousy could become serious if--as can be expected--large numbers of former exiles attempt to claim choice jobs in the bureaucracy. [REDACTED]

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On the whole, the country can probably manage reasonably well in the temporary absence of a central government. With some 40 ethnic groups--most with deeply engrained political and economic systems of their own--Ugandan society is highly fragmented. As a result, there is a strong emphasis on local self-reliance. [REDACTED]

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//While the new government is likely to focus on the central bureaucracy and the military, the appointments of regional administrators may be more important in the long run. There are already indications of concern that ambitious regional administrators assigned to their native areas may be creating personal followings in newly "liberated" areas. The Front's prompt dispatch of additional district commissioners to these areas shows its awareness of the potential political threat involved.//

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Restoring the Ugandan economy to full productivity will be a two-to-three-year effort at best. Agriculture--the principal sector--will benefit from excellent soil and weather conditions, but the once well-developed infrastructure is a shambles.

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Tanzania will face some hard decisions about its future role in the administration and reconstruction of Uganda. It is sustaining a heavy economic drain just to support the 30,000 soldiers it has in the country now, and occupation of the remaining two-thirds of Uganda--should that appear necessary to keep the new government in power--would be a costly proposition. Tanzania probably anticipates that other donors will pick up the costs of launching the new regime and rebuilding its civil and military institutions. If, however, it finds itself locked into prolonged support to Uganda--basically a richer country than Tanzania--it could face discontent at home as a result.

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//Tanzania will probably attempt to assure that the new regime in Uganda will be compatible with Tanzanian interests.

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//Kenya's approval of the new regime could be crucial; it controls Uganda's access to the sea. Kenya, the leading moderate state in East Africa, has long had strained relations with Tanzania, and the border between the two countries has been closed since early 1977. Nyerere, however, has tried to reassure Kenyan leaders at each step of his Ugandan venture.//

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
Kenya remained neutral during the war in Uganda. It provided normal trade and transportation facilities to the Amin regime and resisted Nyerere's efforts to sway its views. Kenya did, however, draw the line by refusing to facilitate Libyan military assistance to Amin. 

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Kenyans share the apprehension of many Africans about the precedent Tanzania has set in Uganda. This is the first time in modern African history that the military forces of one country have seized the capital city of a neighboring country. 

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